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Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the post-Suharto era
provides the first in-depth analysis of contemporary Indonesian party politics
and the first systematic explanation why Golkar is still the strongest party in
Indonesia.
Applying a multidimensional conceptual framework of party institutionaliza-
tion theory, the book examines Golkar’s organizational infrastructure, its deci-
sional autonomy and programmatic platform as well as the party’s relations to
the mass media. Strengths and weaknesses in the individual dimensions of insti-
tutionalization are then contrasted with the corresponding levels of institutional-
ization reached by Indonesia’s other major parties. Tomsa argues that Golkar
remains Indonesia’s strongest party because it is better institutionalized than its
electoral competitors. However, while highlighting the former regime party’s
strengths in key aspects of party institutionalization, he shows that Golkar also
has some considerable institutional weaknesses which in 2004 prevented the
party from achieving an even better result in the general election.
As an empirical study on Golkar, and Indonesia’s other major political
parties, this book will be of huge interest to students and scholars of Southeast
Asian politics, political parties and elections and democratization.
Dirk Tomsa is an associate lecturer at the University of Tasmania, Australia. He
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Preface
In April 2004 Indonesia held its second free and fair legislative elections after
the fall of Suharto. With 21.58 per cent of the vote, the former regime party
Golkar topped the voting tally and thus re-emerged as the strongest party in
Indonesia just six years after the end of the authoritarian New Order regime. The
results were described by some observers as the ‘return of Golkar,’ but in actual
fact Golkar had not returned. Put simply, it could not return because it had never
disappeared. Indeed, even though it had only finished second in the 1999 elec-
tions, Golkar has continued to be the strongest force in Indonesian party politics
and looks set to achieve another good result in the 2009 elections.
In the early stages of the post-Suharto era Golkar’s enduring strength seemed
to surprise many observers, while others said ‘I always told you so’. But regard-
less of their convictions, no one actually seemed interested in seriously investi-
gating why and how the former regime party had been able to transform itself
from an artificially created electoral vehicle into a highly competitive political
party. Neither was I. It was Professor Merle Ricklefs, back in 2002, who first
suggested that I should look into this as a potential topic for my planned doctoral
dissertation at the University of Melbourne. Initially reluctant, I soon realized
how little was known about Golkar, and indeed about post-New Order party
politics in general, so I gradually warmed up to the idea and by 2003 I was ready
to go. The decision to work on Golkar earned me a fair share of jeers from some
of my Indonesian friends who had been involved in the 1998 demonstrations
that helped bring the New Order regime to its knees. But after a while I con-
vinced them of the academic value of such a study and that I was not going to be
an adviser for the former regime party.
And so I embarked on a fascinating academic journey which offered me
unprecedented insights into the dynamics of party politics in Indonesia. The
research project was effectively concluded in early 2006, but several revisions
and amendments have been added since the completion of the original disserta-
tion, resulting eventually in the manuscript for this book. Significantly, my
research helped me understand not only why Golkar was able to redefine itself
as a competitive party, but also why it is likely to continue to influence the
course of Indonesia’s democratization process for the foreseeable future. Indeed,
although many indicators point to a decreasing role for political parties in
Indonesia, predictions of their complete demise appear greatly exaggerated.
Contemporary representative democracy is, in the vast majority of countries,
party democracy, and if Indonesia continues its arguably protracted, but relat-
ively steady progress towards democratic consolidation, it is unlikely to be an
exception.
Golkar, as the best-institutionalized of all Indonesian parties, looks set to
remain an integral part of this maturing Indonesian democracy. The party has in
fact made a number of significant contributions to the country’s democratization
process in the last ten years. At the same time, however, it has also been one of
those forces that have repeatedly slowed down the progression towards demo-
cracy. This book will explain how and why Golkar has been so instrumental in
Indonesia’s political development after the fall of Suharto – in both a positive
and a negative sense. Approaching the topic from the perspective of party insti-
tutionalization theory, it will be argued that compared to the other parties Golkar
possesses some crucial institutional advantages, which have helped the party to
maintain much of its strength in the post-New Order period. In 2004 these insti-
tutional strengths translated directly into votes at the ballot box, catapulting the
party back to the top of the voting tally. Golkar’s ‘victory,’ however, was by no
means as resounding as many observers had predicted. Indeed, the party’s
failure to win the elections by a larger margin indicated that Golkar apparently
had certain weaknesses which have directly conferred disadvantages at the ballot
box. In other words, there are good reasons to argue – and this book will in fact
do so – that Golkar owed its ‘victory’ more to the weakness of the other parties
than to its own prowess.
In about a year from now, Indonesians will go to the polls again. At this
stage, Golkar looks set to achieve yet another good result. Consecutive opinion
polls throughout 2007 have confirmed that impression. However, it seems as if
little has changed with regards to the reasons for Golkar’s enduring strength.
Since 2004 the party has done fairly little to sharpen its profile and attract new
supporters. But as most of the other parties have done even less, there may be no
need to worry. And yet, as the rising popularity of the Democrats Party (Partai
Demokrat) in the wake of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s performance in the
presidential palace shows, it may not be the best strategy for Golkar to simply
rely on the expectation that the others will not improve.
This book is not intended to give advice to the Golkar leadership on how to
run the party or how to prepare for elections. Rather, its purpose is to provide a
scholarly explanation as to why Golkar has been able to maintain much of its
strength after the fall of Suharto. At the same time, however, the book will also
elucidate why Golkar has only been able to shape, not to dictate, the course of
Indonesia’s democratization process. In doing so, it will hopefully enhance our
understanding of party politics in Indonesia and the overall implications of party
institutionalization for processes of democratization.
Launceston, January 2008
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1 Introduction
The remarkable resilience of Golkar
Writing about political parties in Indonesia makes one suddenly aware of how
little research has been done on the subject.
(Lev 1967: 52)
Introduction
When the late Daniel Lev lamented the lack of research on political parties back
in 1967, Indonesia was still a young republic with a short, yet already turbulent
post-colonial history. In the 22 years since the declaration of independence the
country had experienced a revolutionary war (1945–9), a brief spell of
parliamentary democracy (1950–9) and an even shorter period of so-called
‘Guided Democracy’ (1959–65). By the time Lev’s article went to print, Indone-
sia’s second president Suharto was just about to establish what would later
become known as the New Order (Orde Baru).
As it turned out, the New Order proved much more durable than the previous
political systems. Designed as a military-backed bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime with strong corporatist elements,1 it lasted for more than 30 years
(1966–98). Throughout these years political parties found themselves relegated
to passive bystanders as the Suharto regime systematically depoliticized and de-
ideologized all political processes. In view of this situation it was hardly
surprising that most academics who conducted research on Indonesian politics
during this period remained largely indifferent towards political parties. Put
simply, there was nothing to do research on. In fact, parties were so discredited
during the New Order that the Suharto regime even refused to define its own de
facto regime party as a party. Instead, the organization that was used by the
regime as its electoral vehicle was constructed as an amalgamation of so-called
‘Functional Groups’ (Golongan Karya or Golkar), and it was supposed to
remain aloof from the allegedly divisive squabbling of political parties. Despite
the rhetoric, however, Golkar was essentially a political party, at least from 1971
onwards when it participated in its first general election.2
Based on conceptualizations by Sartori (1976: 63) and Puhle (2002: 81),
political parties can simply be defined as political organizations with an official
label that present candidates for elections (competitive or non-competitive), with
the goal of placing these candidates for public office. According to this defini-
tion, Golkar was indeed a political party and it is arguably irrelevant whether the
regime actually called it a party or not. Of course, Golkar did not fulfil most of
the ideal-type functions which theorists routinely attribute to political parties,
such as the representation, integration and aggregation of societal interests or the
crafting and implementation of policy agendas.3 But it did fulfil most of the
functions which Randall (1988) had once described as key functions of political
parties in the so-called ‘Third World’: it was used to enhance the regime’s
domestic and international legitimacy, to recruit political personnel and to
provide the ruling elite with an institutional structure down to the lowest admin-
istrative level.
Thus, Golkar was primarily an instrument of the regime. As such, the party
was an important mosaic stone in the New Order regime’s drive for hegemony.
According to Gramsci (1971: 244) hegemony is defined as ‘the entire complex
of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justi-
fies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those
over whom it rules.’ Without a doubt, the construction of Golkar as the regime’s
corporatist tool and electoral vehicle was a crucial part of these activities. Thus,
from 1971 onwards Golkar had once and for all ceased to be ‘an alternative to
the party system,’ as Reeve (1985) had once famously labelled it. Instead, it had
become a hegemonic regime party, acting in a hegemonic party system (Gaffar
1992).4
Between 1971 and 1998 the hegemonic status of Golkar was reinforced
during six consecutive ‘democracy festivals’ (pesta demokrasi), as the Suharto
regime euphemistically called its inherently non-competitive legislative elec-
tions. But when in 1998 the New Order came to an abrupt end, Golkar suddenly
‘seemed destined for the dustbin of history’ (Tomsa 2005: 17). As competitive
party politics was enthusiastically reinvigorated with the formation of more than
100 new parties within a few months, Golkar’s chances of political survival sud-
denly seemed to be slim. Amien Rais, one of the key figures of the reform
(reformasi) movement, for example, opined that Golkar was likely to ‘become
just a small party.’5
As is now well-known, Amien was wrong. Of course Golkar could not main-
tain the ridiculously inflated levels of artificial support which it had enjoyed
during the New Order, but by no means did it become a small party, and it defi-
nitely did not enter the dustbin of history. On the contrary, the party easily
shrugged off initial demands for its disbandment and managed to achieve a
respectable 22 per cent in the first post-Suharto election in 1999. The result was
enough to secure second place on the voting tally, well behind the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P)
of reform icon Megawati Sukarnoputri, but comfortably ahead of other highly
fancied parties including Amien Rais’s National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat
Nasional, PAN) or Abdurrahman Wahid’s National Awakening Party (Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). Following the 1999 election, Golkar quickly re-
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established itself as the most capable political force in national parliamentary
procedures and regional elections. When in 2004 Indonesia held its second legis-
lative election of the post-Suharto era, Golkar re-emerged as the strongest party
on the voting tally, prompting some commentators to describe the election result
as ‘the return of the Golkar Party.’6 In actual fact, however, Golkar had not
returned. It could not return because it had never disappeared. As one former
high-ranking party member who left the party in 1998 remarked rather graphi-
cally, ‘Golkar is like a zombie; you think it is dead but in fact it is always
there.’7
The main argument
Indeed, while it is true that the party was only the second-largest fraction in par-
liament between 1999 and 2004, the statistical figures never reflected the real
power structure in Indonesian party politics during these years. Under the
leadership of its chairman Akbar Tandjung (1998–2004) Golkar was able to
steer most of the important political developments in Indonesia in its own
favour. Significantly, the party was not only instrumental in orchestrating the
rise and fall of Indonesia’s first elected president Abdurrahman Wahid
(1999–2001), but also in overseeing the formulation of crucial constitutional
amendments and new election and party laws. Moreover, the party secured
numerous governor, mayor and district head (bupati) posts in the regions, often
at the expense of inexperienced PDI-P candidates.
In view of these developments, Golkar’s election victory in 2004 was hardly
surprising. On the contrary, many observers had actually expected that the
former regime party would not only emerge as the strongest party, but even that
it would win the election by a bigger margin (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2003).
These predictions, however, turned out to be wrong, and this very fact illustrates
how little is actually known about the real strengths and weaknesses of Golkar.
Indeed, until the present day there has been no systematic analysis of Golkar and
its role in Indonesia’s ongoing democratization process. This book aims to fill
this gap by examining the former hegemonic party’s position in post-New Order
Indonesia from the perspective of party institutionalization theory. More pre-
cisely, the book will analyse whether Golkar’s perpetuated strength can be
explained as a result of uneven party institutionalization in post-1998 Indonesia.
A number of political observers have already pointed to Golkar’s institutional
superiority as a reason behind the party’s extraordinary tenacity (Suryadinata
2002, Kingsbury 2002, Budiman 1999). However, despite frequent references to
‘Golkar’s massive party machinery’ no methodical analysis of Golkar’s institu-
tional features exists so far. This work will conduct this urgently needed analysis
and provide a comprehensive overview of Golkar’s degree of institutionalization
in accordance with a multidimensional model developed by Vicky Randall and
Lars Svåsand (2002a). The analysis will not only help to explain why and how
Golkar managed to win the 2004 election, but also why it did not win by a larger
margin.
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In short, the book puts forward three main arguments. First, it will be high-
lighted that Golkar is indeed the best-institutionalized party in Indonesia and
that most of its institutional advantages are direct consequences of its long
history as a hegemonic party during the New Order. Significantly, the uneven
degree of party institutionalization has conferred immediate electoral advantages
to Golkar as the party has harnessed its strengths to secure the highest number of
votes in the 2004 elections. Second, despite its overall supremacy Golkar is not
a particularly well-institutionalized party. It is strong in certain aspects of party
institutionalization, but it also has considerable institutional weaknesses, and it
is these weaknesses that primarily account for the party’s failure to achieve an
even better result in the 2004 election. Most remarkably, the party appears to
have entered an incremental process of de-institutionalization, triggered by a
combination of internal and external factors, which may pose some serious chal-
lenges to the party in the future. Third, in spite of these challenges Golkar’s
strong position in the party system seems set to last, simply because most of the
other parties remain weakly institutionalized and unable to capitalize on
Golkar’s problems. With the exception of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) all other parties have failed to develop effective party
infrastructures and/or appealing policy platforms. Instead, they have tried to
build their existence primarily on the charismatic appeal of individual leaders,
the use of old-style money politics or the exploitation of narrowly focused sec-
tarian sentiment. As a result, levels of institutionalization have remained low
and electoral success elusive. Consequently, Golkar has been able to uphold and
even strengthen its grip on the party system. To sum up, this book will argue
that ten years after the fall of Suharto the former regime party Golkar is still the
strongest party in Indonesia, yet not by virtue of its own power but rather by
default.
Methodology
In order to properly assess Golkar’s strengths and weaknesses, this book relies
strongly on a conceptual framework developed by Vicky Randall and Lars
Svåsand in their 2002 article ‘Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.’ In
this article, the authors ‘unpick some of the conceptual confusion’ (Randall and
Svåsand 2002a: 6) that has surrounded the idea of party institutionalization,
especially the common ‘tendency to elide the issue of party institutionalization
with that of party system institutionalization’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 6).
One of the main ‘culprits’ in this regard is Scott Mainwaring (1999) whose
otherwise excellent work on party system institutionalization in Latin America
falls into exactly this conceptual trap. Similarly, the only systematic study on
party system institutionalization in Indonesia by Johnson (2002) also suffers
from the same weaknesses as she applies Mainwaring’s model without question-
ing the direct inclusion of issues of party institutionalization in her analysis of
party system institutionalization. Randall and Svåsand’s model, which will be
explained in great detail in Chapter 2, avoids this trap as it proposes the use of
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clear-cut criteria for party institutionalization, while developing a separate set of
criteria for party system institutionalization.
While Randall and Svåsand have successfully overcome one major problem
of party institutionalization theory, they have shied away from proposing solu-
tions to the other key issue that has haunted studies on institutionalization: mea-
surability. As a matter of fact, party institutionalization, as well as party system
institutionalization, has long been criticized as basically immeasurable, and most
of the criteria Randall and Svåsand describe as key components of their concept
are also, as they concede, neither measurable nor quantifiable. This lack of mea-
surability has always posed serious challenges to political scientists working on
the subject. Of course, it is possible to make meaningful statements about a
party’s degree of institutionalization without measurable variables. But espe-
cially when the analysis extends to more than just one party (as this book does in
Chapter 7), a set of measurable criteria would certainly enhance the analytical
value of the comparison.8
While this book does not claim to square the circle of institutionalization
theory and come up with the ultimate solution to this problem, it does propose to
resort to Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) suggestion to measure the degree of
institutionalization with the help of a ranking system, if only for reasons of illus-
tration. Naturally, such a system is inherently subjective and it is certainly not
meant to be the main point of reference for the results of this book. Yet, for the
purpose of illustration, it should be considered as a useful tool and therefore the
final chapter concludes with a matrix which shows in a simplified yet systematic
manner the varying degrees of institutionalization for Indonesia’s seven biggest
parties.
The findings presented in this matrix are the result of a research project that
relied on a broad diversity of sources. For the theoretical underpinnings of the
argument the secondary literature on parties, party institutionalization and demo-
cratic transitions was reviewed and evaluated. For the empirical part of the
analysis, on the other hand, the project relied mostly on information from the
Indonesian and international press, as well as a number of primary sources,
especially official party documents, data from personal observations during
fieldwork, and a multitude of personal interviews that were conducted with
politicians, political observers, journalists and civil society activists.9 Whenever
useful, academic literature was consulted in order to support information
obtained from the media or the various primary sources, but it should be noted
that, owing to the sheer contemporariness of the topic, it was often difficult to
find relevant secondary material.
Data collection in Indonesia was completed during two field trips in 2004 and
2005. The first draft of the manuscript was completed in 2006, but some new
materials were added during the revision process. Nonetheless, the main focus
of the analysis remains firmly on the 2004 elections. As far as geographical
scope is concerned, the book deals primarily with politics on the national level
in Jakarta. Wherever possible and useful, however, additional data from local
political contexts have been supplied to further elucidate the argument. Most of
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these local data is derived from South Sulawesi where the researcher spent
several weeks during his fieldwork in 2004. The province was chosen as a ‘mini’
case study for two reasons. First, it is one of Golkar’s most important strong-
holds, or, as the Indonesian media likes to put it, its ‘rice barn’ (lumbung).10 In
1999, South Sulawesi was one of the few provinces where Golkar still reached
an absolute majority so that it was particularly interesting in 2004 to see how the
party set out to defend this result. As it turned out, South Sulawesi became one
of the provinces where Golkar sustained its highest losses, thereby vindicating
the presumption that political developments in this province would be particu-
larly interesting to analyse. Second, South Sulawesi provides an excellent setting
for studying some of the key characteristics of Indonesian party politics such as
personalism, factionalism, patron–clientelism and the prevalence of regional
sentiment. All of these characteristics can be found in abundance in South
Sulawesi, which makes it one of the most exciting places to study party politics.
Of course, this researcher is fully aware that data from only one province are by
no means representative of developments in other parts of Indonesia. Nonethe-
less, the data provided here help to underline certain internal developments
within Golkar, and therefore contribute to a better understanding of the manifold
dynamics in the party.
Structure
The book is divided into eight chapters. Following this brief introduction,
Chapter 2 will elucidate the theoretical concept of party institutionalization and
its relevance in explaining the enduring strength of Golkar. Moreover, this
chapter further elaborates on the already mentioned difference between party
institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Chapters 3 to 6 discuss
in great detail Golkar’s development in four different dimensions of party insti-
tutionalization, termed systemness, decisional autonomy, value infusion and
reification by Randall and Svåsand (2002a).
Chapter 3 on systemness is the longest chapter of this book, simply because
this dimension covers some of those aspects of party institutionalization that are
often mentioned as Golkar’s most effective strengths. In order to determine
whether Golkar really possesses such a superior party machinery as is often
assumed, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the party’s organizational
features, with particular reference to the organizational infrastructure, the rela-
tionship between the party and its leader, and the role of factionalism within the
party. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the importance of formal and informal
institutions and explains why the party has been able to maintain excellent
access to human and financial resources.
Chapter 4 on decisional autonomy examines whether Golkar is an independ-
ent party and to what extent it can make crucial policy and personnel decisions
without interference from external forces. Due to historical bonds, the armed
forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI, formerly known as Angkatan Bersen-
jata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) are a logical focus of this chapter. The second
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part then moves away from tangible actors and looks at the role of corruption
and money politics in influencing decision-making processes within the party. It
also touches upon the tensions between external and internal threats to deci-
sional autonomy.
Chapter 5 on value infusion answers the question of whether Golkar is
infused with any political or cultural values that make people feel attached to the
party. Against the background of the ongoing debate on whether Indonesian
voting behaviour can still be explained with traditional aliran (literally, streams;
in this context cleavages based on socio-cultural dividing lines) approaches, this
chapter looks at both sociological and psychological factors that can influence
party choices.
Chapter 6 on reification evaluates the patterns of political communication
applied by Golkar in order to eradicate its stigma as a disgraced remnant of the
New Order. Based on the assumption that Golkar entered the post-Suharto era as
a highly reified party, this chapter examines how the party has transformed its
public image by forging a double identity, somewhere between progressive
reformism and conservative status quo attitudes. The role of the media is of
particular importance for this analysis, but the politics of symbolism is also
investigated.
Following the four comprehensive chapters on Golkar, Chapter 7 provides
the vital comparative perspective by analysing the degree of institutionalization
of the six other major parties in Indonesia. These include the three reformasi
trailblazers PDI-P, PKB and PAN, the two surprise packages of the 2004 elec-
tion, PKS and the Democrats Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), as well as the United
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). While the analysis
here cannot be as detailed as in the preceding chapters, it still sheds interesting
light on some of the key institutional features of the other parties.
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions and puts them into the
broader context of party system institutionalization and democratization in
Indonesia. A brief outlook of potential further developments rounds out this
book.
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2 Theoretical reflections
Protracted transitions, uneven party
institutionalization and the special role
of former hegemonic parties
Nor, finally, does it mean that we assume that parties are functional for demo-
cracy or its consolidation; on the contrary, it may be expected that in some cir-
cumstances they are part of the problem.
(Randall and Svåsand 2002b: 4)
Introduction
Political parties are widely considered to be an indispensable part of any modern
political system, no matter if it is a Western-style liberal democracy, an authorit-
arian dictatorship or one of the various types of electoral regimes that have
sprung up in the aftermath of what Huntington (1991) called the ‘third wave’ of
democratization. However, ‘political parties are not what they used to be’
(Gunther and Diamond 2001: 3), as it has become increasingly clear that the
types and functions of parties are changing. Especially in the countries of Asia,
Africa and Latin America, political parties rarely fulfil the ideal-type functions
political scientists attribute to them. As Randall (2006) has pointed out, wide-
spread poverty and the resultant lack of material and human resources, coupled
with the manifold legacies of colonialism and subsequent authoritarianism have
significantly impeded the development and, ultimately, the institutionalization of
political parties.1
The concept of institutionalization was pioneered by Samuel Huntington in
the 1960s, but it was not before the 1990s that the specific notion of party and
party system institutionalization rose to prominence in the academic literature.
Spearheaded by Scott Mainwaring, more scholars began to link the ideas of
party and party system institutionalization to problems of democratic consolida-
tion in a growing number of countries that had joined the third wave of
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the institutionalization of
parties and party systems – or rather the lack thereof – was identified with
increasing frequency as one of the key factors for the lack of progress towards
democratic consolidation in many third wave countries including Indonesia, the
subject of this case study.
In order to properly contextualize the Indonesian case within the current
academic debate about political parties and democratization processes, this
chapter will first recap some of the latest developments in the study of compara-
tive democratization. It will then move on to discuss in more detail the concept
of party institutionalization and its significance for the subject of democrat-
ization studies. Towards the end, particular attention will be paid to the poten-
tially ambivalent role that former regime parties can play in democratic
transition processes, especially if they are allowed to continuously exploit long-
established institutional advantages at the expense of new parties.
The transition paradigm revisited
Transitions from authoritarian regimes to more democratic forms of government
have been the focus of analysis for political scientists ever since O’Donnell and
Schmitter (1986) published their seminal work on transitions in Latin America
and Southern Europe. Soon afterwards, the wave of democratization had spread
all over the world, prompting one scholar to enthusiastically declare ‘the end of
history’ (Fukuyama 1992). By the turn of the millennium, however, the enthusi-
asm was gone, replaced by a growing awareness that the third wave had actually
produced very few liberal democracies. Instead, a puzzling array of ‘demo-
cracies with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997) and ‘hybrid regimes’
(Diamond 2002) had emerged, posing unprecedented conceptual challenges to
scholars of comparative democratization.
Defining regime types
After O’Donnell and Schmitter’s now famous transition paradigm had first
entered the academic agenda, scholars soon scrambled to find a consensus about
what actually constitutes a consolidated democracy. Early minimalist definitions
referred to Schumpeter’s (1947) procedural understanding of democracy and
claimed that two consecutive changes of government by means of peacefully
conducted elections are already sufficient to call a democratic regime consoli-
dated (Huntington 1991). But the exclusive focus on elections as the sole deci-
sive factor for determining democratic consolidation was quickly criticized as
too simplistic. As Elklit (2001: 57) stressed, ‘the holding of acceptable elections
is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for development towards fully
fledged liberal democracies.’
Therefore, more sophisticated concepts of consolidation were soon formu-
lated by scholars like Gunther et al. (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996) or Merkel
(1998). In fact, Linz and Stepan’s assertion that consolidation needs to combine
constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal dimensions soon emerged as one of
the most-frequently quoted concepts of democratic consolidation. According to
the authors, a consolidated democracy is ‘a political regime in which democracy
as a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincen-
tives has become, in a phrase “the only game in town” ’ (Linz and Stepan 1996:
15). This concept was further elaborated by Merkel (1998, 1999) who argued
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that democratic consolidation includes not only the three dimensions as laid out
by Linz and Stepan – constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal – but also a
level of representative consolidation which comprises the territorial and func-
tional representation of societal interests as articulated through political parties
and interest groups.
The more sophisticated the concepts grew, the more apparent it became that
only a very small number of third wave countries were actually progressing
towards the normative ideal of liberal democracy that underpinned the defini-
tions of Linz and Stepan or Merkel. By the turn of the millennium, it was widely
acknowledged that despite the adoption of democratic constitutions and the
holding of free and fair elections, the vast majority of countries that had com-
menced democratization processes in the 1980s and 1990s still suffered from
several fundamental weaknesses. Typical problems included a lack of citizen
participation in politics beyond election times, the poor enforcement of civil lib-
erties, the enduring political influence of so-called veto actors such as the mili-
tary, and the prevalence of conflicting responsibilities between executives and
legislatures due to unclear constitutional arrangements.
In order to distinguish regimes with such democratic deficits from established
liberal democracies, it has become common practice to describe them as ‘elect-
oral democracies.’ According to Haynes (2001a: 8), electoral democracy is a
rather pure form of elite democracy which typically involves ‘political competi-
tion or collaboration among groups of powerful elites, often exclusive oli-
garchies dominated by relatively small groups of powerful men (and rarely
women).’ Effectively, electoral democracy is an umbrella term for all those
regimes that conform to Huntington’s minimalist definition of democracy, but
which may be lacking in several other characteristics of liberal democracy.2
More recently, however, an increasing number of scholars have suggested that
even competitive elections may no longer be a sufficient indicator to call a regime
democratic. As Levitsky and Way (forthcoming: 2) write in their scathing critique
of what they call ‘a pronounced democratizing bias that pervaded the post-Cold
War literature on regime change,’ elections in many countries today may be
competitive, but they are not fair. Therefore, the authors argue that it is entirely
inappropriate to use the term ‘democracy’ for these regimes. Instead, they propose
to label them according to what they effectively are, namely authoritarian regimes.
However, since countries like, for example, Singapore or Malaysia are still very
different from closed authoritarian regimes like, for example, Myanmar, China or
Saudi Arabia, the authors introduce the term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levit-
sky and Way 2002; forthcoming) for more conceptual clarity.
Other scholars have echoed Levitsky and Way’s view, but have invented new
labels for what is essentially the same phenomenon. Ottaway (2003), for
example, calls these regimes ‘semi-authoritarian,’ while Schedler (2002, 2006)
speaks of ‘electoral authoritarianism.’ Pointing to an extensive ‘menu of mani-
pulation’ that governments use in order to sway election results in their favour,
Schedler (2006: 3) has also criticized the overly optimistic view that elections
are indicators of democracy.
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Electoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by
holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative
assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and
fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments
of authoritarian rule rather than ‘instruments of democracy’ (Powell 2000).
Under electoral authoritarian rule, elections are broadly inclusive [. . .] as
well as minimally pluralistic [. . .], minimally competitive [. . .], and mini-
mally open [. . .]. Overall, however, electoral contests are subject to state
manipulation so severe, widespread, and systematic that they do not qualify
as democratic.
(Schedler 2006: 3)
The new discourse highlights the fact that the widespread optimism that sur-
rounded the study of comparative democratization in the 1990s has given way to
a much more sober assessment of a reality in which democracy is actually very
rarely the only game in town. At the same time, however, the ever-increasing
number of conceptual categories has led to growing difficulty in determining
precisely the boundaries between the various new regime types. Of course,
textbook-style regime classifications never entirely match messy realities, but
there is little doubt that the puzzling array of new regime types and especially
the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism pose increasingly complex
challenges to scholars of comparative politics. As more and more countries are
entering a foggy ‘grey area’ (Diamond 2002) between the clearly defined analyt-
ical poles of liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism, the long-cherished
transition paradigm of liberalization, democratization and consolidation appears
to be increasingly obsolete (Carothers 2002).
Protracted transitions and the special role of former hegemonic
parties
The growing scepticism towards the usefulness of the transition paradigm is
based on the recognition that even though many countries initiated a transition in
the 1980s or 1990s, they never really democratized. Levitsky and Way (forth-
coming) are particularly critical of attempts to frame what are effectively
authoritarian regimes as democratic, especially where authoritarian practices
have continued over a prolonged period. Despite the perfectly valid criticism
though, there are indeed cases where characterizations such as ‘evolving demo-
cracy’ or ‘protracted transition’ seem justified. In countries like Mexico,
Taiwan, South Korea or Indonesia, for example, clear progress towards demo-
cracy has been made in recent years, albeit not necessarily in accordance with
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s ideal-type mode of pact-making.3
Eisenstadt (2000) has argued that in these countries the transitions to demo-
cracy have been ‘protracted’ precisely because there was no opportunity for a
pacted transition and there was a lack of consensus among elites about how
exactly the political system should be changed. The uncertainty about the
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outcome of negotiations between old regime forces and reformers then resulted
in a distinctively slow process of reforming numerous small sectors of the polity
instead of a general overhaul of all relevant political institutions. Owing to the
protracted nature of the transition process, enclaves of authoritarianism
remained intact not just immediately after the initiation of the transition to
democracy, but long after the old regime had been replaced by a newly elected
government. For several years, therefore, countries like Mexico or Taiwan
would have qualified as competitive authoritarian regimes, but at the same time
the political process during those years was far from static. Incrementally, these
countries dismantled the remnants of authoritarianism and eventually progressed
towards electoral democracy.
Mexico and Taiwan are archetypes of protracted transitions as their respec-
tive transition processes have been prolonged over decades. In these countries,
the initial failure to abolish authoritarian practices has proven particularly bene-
ficial for the old regime parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang,
KMT), as they were given sufficient time to adjust to the changing political
environment. Although the two parties played very different roles in their
respective polities, the Mexican and the Taiwanese transition cases share a
number of similarities. Both countries had conducted more or less blatantly
rigged elections for years, and in both countries it was electoral reform that
finally paved the way for the opposition to seize their chance. Rampant corrup-
tion, fraud and eventual splits in the ruling parties further weakened the regimes,
so that charismatic opposition candidates were finally elected presidents in 2000
and hegemonic party rule came to an end in both countries (Solinger 2001).
However, despite the loss of the presidency, both the PRI and the KMT have
continued to wield immense influence over the political process even though
they have lost their positions of absolute dominance.
The special roles of the PRI and the KMT in the course of the Mexican and
Taiwanese transitions indicate that the possibilities for the growth and institu-
tionalization of new parties may be severely limited as long as a former regime
party maintains superior access to financial, material and human resources.
‘Unequal resources invariably make for unequal political outcomes,’ as Rigger
(2000: 137) has aptly remarked. If these inequalities are not levelled over time,
elections may remain restricted in their competitiveness and fairness, thereby
jeopardizing the long-term prospects for democratic consolidation. As Chu
(1999: 78–9) has argued for the Taiwanese case:
There is no doubt that the persistence of these holdover issues of regime
transition will continue to obstruct, if not distort, the normal functioning of
Taiwan’s newly established representative democracy and pose a series of
difficult challenges to the task of democratic consolidation.
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The Indonesian transition to democracy: protracted, but on track
As previously mentioned, Indonesia has also been identified as a case of pro-
tracted transition. The Southeast Asian giant embarked on the democratization
path in May 1998 when long-time President Suharto stepped down in the midst
of economic turmoil and massive student protests.4 Writing in the early days of
the post-Suharto era, Malley (2000) claimed that the oppositional forces in
Indonesia had been unable to negotiate a pacted transition because they were not
prepared to capitalize on the unexpected opportunities that opened up in front of
them when the Suharto regime suddenly ruptured. Shortly after Suharto’s resig-
nation, interim president Habibie initiated the revision of electoral institutions
and laws on parties and legislatures, yet there was little input from opposition
forces as they were too preoccupied with establishing an organizational infra-
structure for their newly founded parties (Malley 2000: 172).5
Not surprisingly then, the outcome of the negotiations between the Habibie
government and the four old parliamentary fractions of the military, Golkar,
PPP, and the old Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia,
PDI) was little more than a ‘half-hearted reform’ (King 2003) and Indonesia’s
new political system at first remained laden with authoritarian leftovers. The
successful holding of free and fair elections in June 1999 and the formation of a
new government in October 1999 did little to change this impression. Pointing
to structural advantages for Golkar enshrined in the reformulated election laws,
the retention of the military’s role in politics, the hesitation to fight corruption
and the unwillingness to reappraise human rights violations by members of the
old regime, Malley (2000: 177) concluded that ‘Indonesia should be character-
ized as being on a protracted transition path rather than in a consolidation
phase.’ Similarly, Diamond (2002: 31) included Indonesia in his list of ‘ambigu-
ous regimes,’ mainly because of the continued presence of non-elected represen-
tatives in parliament. But arguably the most critical assessment of Indonesia’s
early post-New Order trajectory came from Vedi Hadiz who maintained that the
country was actually not in a protracted transition, but had in fact already com-
pleted a very rapid transition – just not into a democracy but rather into an
obscure ‘something else’:
It is in fact erroneous to suggest that Indonesia is still in ‘transition’.
Instead, the new patterns and essential dynamics of the exercise of social,
economic and political power have already become more or less estab-
lished. [. . .] Thus, violence, money politics, alleged political murders and
kidnappings [. . .] are not regarded in this essay as symptomatic of a
painfully consolidating or maturing (liberal) democracy, but fundamental
instead to the logic of a ‘something else’ already more or less entrenched.
(Hadiz 2003: 120–1)
A few years later it is obvious that many of the problems mentioned by Hadiz
still persist. At the same time, however, it is clear that Indonesia has also taken
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some significant steps towards democracy. Of course, as Malley (2000: 155) had
predicted, this democratization process was characterized by ‘prolonged and
repeated struggles to reform specific institutions’ and constant bickering
between elites over how and to what extent the political system should be
changed. In fact, between 1999 and 2002, Indonesia completed a painfully
drawn-out series of constitutional amendments, leaving the once-sacred docu-
ment with more new than old paragraphs. But despite this patchwork style of
reform the overall results were quite remarkable. Among the most outstanding
achievements were the introduction of direct presidential elections, direct guber-
natorial and bupati elections (pemilihan kepala daerah, pilkada), the abolition of
non-elected representatives in parliament (including the military), the formation
of a second legislative chamber6 and the establishment of a Constitutional Court
(Crouch 2003).
With these reforms in place, the country successfully conducted an unprece-
dented electoral marathon in 2004. The ‘year of voting dangerously’ (Emmerson
2004) started in April with parliamentary elections on three administrative levels
(national, provincial and district) and elections to the newly established
Regional Representatives Council, continued in July with the first round of
presidential elections and finally ended in September with the election of former
general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as Indonesia’s sixth president.
Every single round of voting has been described as free and fair and in overall
accordance with democratic standards by academics (Qodari 2005) and inter-
national election monitors alike,7 so that Indonesia can now definitely be
labelled an electoral democracy8 (see Table 2.1 for election results).
Following the success of the 2004 elections, Indonesia has further democra-
tized its political system, especially in the arena of electoral politics where the
introduction of the pilkada in 2005 has significantly enhanced the openness and
competitiveness of voting processes in the regions. In view of these achieve-
ments the reputable non-governmental organization Freedom House, in its
annual Freedom in the World survey, recently promoted Indonesia from being a
‘partly free’ country to a ‘free’ country (Freedom House 2005, 2006, 2007).
Yet, beyond the surface of democratic elections there is still a lot that remains
to be done. Old, established patterns of thinking obviously still prevail among
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Table 2.1 Results of the legislative elections 1999 and 2004 (in per cent)
Party 1999 2004 Gained/lost
Partai Golkar 22.44 21.58 –0.86
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) 33.74 18.53 –15.21
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) 12.61 10.57 –2.04
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 10.71 8.15 –2.56
Partai Demokrat (PD) – 7.45 +7.45
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 1.36 7.34 +5.98
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) 7.12 6.44 –0.68
Sources: www.kpu.go.id; Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2005: 14 and 22).
large parts of the political elite and few attempts have been made to address
endemic problems such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (better known as
korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme or KKN in Indonesia). As Robison and Hadiz (2004)
have shown, many of the old oligarchic power networks between business and
politics are still intact as they have successfully adapted to the new political
environment without changing their predatory mentality. Despite continued
efforts by democracy activists and non-governmental organizations to dismantle
these networks, prospects for improvement appear slim as long as regulations
about political finance are not sharpened and more strictly implemented. Fur-
thermore, the problem of corruption has been exacerbated by the negative side
effects of the well-intentioned decentralization programme as hundreds of
regional parliamentarians, governors and bupatis have succumbed to the tempta-
tions of power and misused public funds for personal enrichment. Countless
local politicians have been implicated in such cases since the start of regional
autonomy in 2001 and have thus further contributed to the deterioration of
public trust in elected officials.9
Apart from a lack of political will and determination at the highest political
level in Jakarta, another – arguably closely related – key obstacle in the fight
against corruption is the slow progress towards reform in the upper echelons of
the judiciary. The very fact that no serious efforts were made to prosecute
former president Suharto for his alleged embezzlement of billions of dollars
during his time as head of state clearly underlines just how much remains to be
done in this sector.10 Moreover, those few reform-minded judges that have
emerged in the lower ranks of the system in recent years have seen their efforts
being ridiculed on an almost regular basis when the judgements they had passed
down on high-profile corruptors were later overturned at a higher level.11 But it
is not only contentious cases of corruption and collusion where the judiciary has
been at the centre of criticism. Another arena of struggle between reformers and
status quo forces has been the issue of past human rights violations by members
of the New Order regime, especially former president Suharto himself and the
armed forces. Several cases against members of the military have been brought
to court in recent years, but rarely have the verdicts been in accordance with
expectations of human rights campaigners (Sulistiyanto 2007).12 The successful
blocking of efforts to reassess the past sheds worrisome light on the role of the
military in post-Suharto Indonesia. While the formal political power of the
armed forces has been curbed after its reserved seats in parliament were abol-
ished,13 the TNI does still wield considerable informal power. This became
evident not only in the above-mentioned trials, but also in the resumption of mil-
itary action in Aceh in 2003 (Jones 2004) and in the dispute about the TNI bill in
2004. In both cases, the military leadership exerted enormous pressure upon the
government and lawmakers so that many of their demands were eventually
granted.14
Apart from corruption and the role of the military, another urgent problem –
and the one that is central to this book – is the performance of the political
parties. Bestowed with high expectations in the early days of reformasi, the
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parties have contributed fairly little to the consolidation of Indonesia’s young
democracy. To be fair, it was the representatives of the parties who crafted the
new political format of Indonesia’s post-authoritarian system, but apart from this
achievement their overall parliamentary track record has been rather disappoint-
ing so far (Ziegenhain 2005). Moreover, outside parliament most of the parties
that had won seats in the 1999 general election failed to undertake substantial
efforts to strengthen their organizational infrastructures or to develop appealing
party programmes.
The 2004 election results, however, indicate that these things may matter not
only in abstract discussions about institutionalization, but also at the ballot box.
The importance of a well-developed party infrastructure, for instance, was doc-
umented by the fact that the two parties which possess the most comprehensive
networks of branch offices in the country, Golkar and PDI-P, remained the top
vote-getters. Furthermore, the only party that had seriously endeavoured to
actually enhance its organizational apparatus in recent years, PKS, reaped con-
siderable benefits for its efforts and gained almost 6 per cent compared to 1999.
The good results of PKS and another new party, PD, were often interpreted as
retribution for the established parties or, more generally, as proof of the rational-
ization of Indonesian voters and the overall maturation of Indonesian demo-
cracy. Yet the success of the two newcomers cannot disguise the fact that
despite widespread disappointment with the status quo, big parties like Golkar
and, to a lesser extent, PDI-P still received the lion’s share of the vote. Thus, the
results indicated that, just like in Taiwan and Mexico, Indonesia’s former hege-
monic party has also been able to exploit the slow progress of the democrati-
zation process to its own advantage.
The role of parties and the importance of party
institutionalization
The pivotal role of Golkar in Indonesia’s democratization process has drawn
surprisingly little academic attention so far. Indeed, post-Suharto party politics
in general was long overlooked by most scholars, even though some good con-
tributions have been made recently.15 The lack of attention is surprising insofar
as there is near-universal agreement that the role of political parties is of
immense importance in newly democratizing countries (Burnell 2004, Mainwar-
ing 1999, Merkel 1998). As organizations acting on the intermediate level
between state and society, parties have the crucial function of linking the elec-
torate to the government and the legislature. Their strategic position gives them
a high responsibility not only for the legitimacy but also for the efficiency of a
newly installed regime. Thus, the structure and performance of the parties have a
direct impact on the prospects for democratic consolidation:
[I]deology, structure and behaviour of the parties are not only of utmost
importance for the survival or breakdown of young democracies but they
also constitute critical factors determining whether democracies consolidate
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or instead remain in a grey zone [. . .], somewhere between functioning
liberal democracies and plebiscitarian authoritarianism.
(Merkel 1998: 50)
Approaches to party institutionalization
The heightened awareness of the importance of political parties for processes of
democratic consolidation goes hand in hand with the realization that traditional
explanatory patterns of the formation and consolidation of parties and party
systems are no longer sufficient to depict the ever-expanding variety of aspects
that influence the functionality of modern parties and party systems. Factors like
the nature of the regime type (presidential or parliamentary), the polarization
along social cleavage structures or the type of electoral system continue to play
a significant role, but in the context of analysing party politics in developing
countries particular attention has recently been paid to the importance of party
and party system institutionalization – and often the lack thereof as a key obs-
tacle to meaningful progress towards democratic consolidation (Kuenzi and
Lambright 2001, Levitsky 2003, Mainwaring 1999, Randall and Svåsand 2002a,
Sahli 2003, Stockton 2001,Tan 2002, 2006, Ufen 2006).
Predictably, the strong focus on institutionalization approaches in recent
years has drawn criticism from some scholars. Morgenstern and Vázquez-D’Elía
(2007: 157), for example, have lamented that the bias towards party institution-
alization has, at least in some cases, led scholars to overlook the immense influ-
ence electoral institutions continue to exert on the shape of parties and party
systems in the developing world.16 Furthermore, a much more fundamental
critique has come from proponents of social conflict theory who have argued
that it is not simply the lack of properly institutionalized parties and party
systems that derails the processes of democratic consolidation, but rather the
capturing of political institutions by ‘old predatory interests’ (Hadiz 2003: 121).
In this view, the whole transition paradigm is flawed because underlying con-
stellations of power will always survive changes in the formal regime structure
and reconstitute themselves within the confines of new institutions. Accordingly,
political parties would only be able to fulfil their idealized democratic functions
if society at large underwent a comprehensive social transformation.
These valid criticisms notwithstanding, the ever-growing literature on party
and party system institutionalization suggests that the level of institutionaliza-
tion does indeed play a crucially important role in explaining the complex inter-
play between political parties and democratization in non-Western countries. In
fact, focusing on party institutionalization does not necessarily rule out the
incorporation of so-called ‘predatory interests’ into the analysis. What makes
party and party system institutionalization such an important object of analysis
is the fact that in contrast to the mostly well-institutionalized party systems in
the consolidated democracies of Western Europe, North America, Australia and
New Zealand, party systems in the developing world are often characterized by
a high degree of volatility and poor legitimacy while the parties themselves tend
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to suffer from weak roots in society and a lack of professionalism (Mainwaring
1999). As all these factors obstruct the institutionalization of the parties and the
party system, they ultimately also impede prospects for the consolidation of
democracy. In the words of Lindberg (2007: 218): ‘in order to fulfil their demo-
cratic functions to provide accountability, policy preference predictability and
aggregation of interests in society, the configuration of political parties must be
more durable and institutionalized rather than fluid electoral vehicles of power-
seeking entrepreneurs.’ However, despite the growing number of studies dealing
with the institutionalization of parties and party systems, the theoretical concept
of institutionalization as such remains somewhat murky as it is ‘multifaceted,
difficult to operationalize, and sometimes conducive to tautological argument’
(Gunther and Hopkin 2002: 192).
Arguably, the scholar who has most incessantly attempted to overcome pre-
vailing scepticism towards the concept of institutionalization is Scott Mainwar-
ing. Since the 1990s, this renowned expert of Latin American politics has
published an impressive series of articles, books and papers on the issue of party
system institutionalization. His works have inspired many other scholars, as is
evident in the growing number of publications that have applied Mainwaring’s
conceptual framework in countries outside Latin America, including Indonesia
(Buehler and Tan 2007, Hicken 2006, Tan 2002, 2006). In one of his latest
works, Mainwaring and his co-author Mariano Torcal have defined institutional-
ization as ‘a process by which a practice or organization becomes well estab-
lished and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop
expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice
or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring and Torcal
2006: 206). They then proceed to classify an institutionalized party system as
one ‘in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise
that the fundamental rules of party competition and behavior will prevail in the
foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006: 206).
Mainwaring’s conceptualization of party system institutionalization has
evolved over the years, but the key components have essentially remained the
same: stability, rootedness, legitimacy and party organization. Thus, it seems as
if Mainwaring regards party and party system institutionalization as two sides of
the same coin. In other words, his model seems to entail the notion that in order
for a party system to become institutionalized the parties that constitute the
system must also be institutionalized.17 However, this notion has met with criti-
cism from several writers. Bértoa (n.d.: 5), for example, has criticized the con-
flation of party and party system institutionalization in Mainwaring’s work,
arguing that ‘it is not sufficient that individual parties become institutionalized,
for they must also function in the established context of a party system.’
In a similar vein, Wolinetz (2006) has used examples from Central Europe to
argue that party systems can actually be reasonably well institutionalized even if
the parties themselves are weakly institutionalized. Borrowing from Smith
(1989), he argues that all that is needed for a party system to institutionalize is a
‘discernible core’ of parties that interact with each other on a regular basis.
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Significantly, he argues that this core can be developed with parties that do not
necessarily have deep roots in society or strong party organizations.
Yet another critique of Mainwaring’s concept has come from Wallis (2003)
who argued that the inclusion of Mainwaring’s last criterion (party organization)
in the analysis of party system institutionalization is problematic, not only
because party organization is generally more concerned with party than party
system institutionalization, but also because the inclusion of this element can
distort the results of the overall system analysis if the parties that make up the
system are extremely unevenly institutionalized in this dimension. Wallis’s point
draws on observations made earlier by Randall and Svåsand (2002a) who were
indeed among the first to maintain that there is no automatic interdependence
between party institutionalization and party system institutionalization. Like
Bértoa, Wallis and Wolinetz after them, these authors also stressed that ‘[p]arty
system institutionalization is the outcome of a range of developments, only some
of which have to do directly with the constituent parties themselves.’ While con-
ceding that requirements for party institutionalization and party system institu-
tionalization are in many respects ‘mutually supportive or at least compatible’
(Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 8), they pointed out that under special circum-
stances party institutionalization may in fact be counterproductive to party
system institutionalization and consequently to democratic consolidation.
Before discussing the potential perils of party institutionalization, however, it
is first of all necessary to take a closer look at Randall and Svåsand’s approach
to party and party system institutionalization. Interestingly, and in contrast to
Mainwaring and most other scholars working on institutionalization, these
authors focus primarily on the institutionalization of parties rather than party
systems. Starting from the assumption that parties do not only institutionalize in
structural terms, but also in an attitudinal dimension, they define party institu-
tionalization as ‘the process by which the party becomes established in terms
both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture’ (Randall and
Svåsand 2002a: 12). They suggest an innovative model of party institutionaliza-
tion which consists of four interdependent, yet analytically autonomous dimen-
sions that can be categorized along internal/external factors on the one hand and
structural/attitudinal aspects on the other hand (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1 Dimensions of party institutionalization (source: adapted from Randall
and Svåsand 2002a and Randall 2006).
Systemness
First, systemness, a somewhat awkward term adopted from Panebianco,18 refers
to the organizational infrastructure and internal dynamics of a party. To what
extent a party institutionalizes in this dimension is not just determined by its
‘genetic model’ (Panebianco 1988), but also by the routinization of well-known
and widely accepted rules and procedures within the party (O’Donnell 1996).
Following the neo-institutionalist understanding of institutions (North 1990,
Lowndes 2002), these rules and procedures can be formal (e.g. party constitution
or other official party statutes and decrees) or informal (e.g. factionalism, clien-
telism, seniority principle), and their impact on systemness can be analysed in a
variety of aspects, including internal power structures, succession regulations,
decision-making processes, relations between the central leadership and regional
branches, and the regularization of access to financial resources.
A party’s genetic model, or the process of its formation and its subsequent
organizational consolidation, plays an important role in its prospects for long-
term institutionalization. Arguing from a European perspective, Panebianco
(1988: 53) claims that parties which are created in the centre and then gradually
spread to the periphery have a better chance of institutionalization than parties
that come into existence as a result of ‘spontaneous germination’ in the regions.
However, few parties in the developing world have had the chance to evolve
gradually over time as they experienced frequent interruptions when authorit-
arian regimes arbitrarily changed crucial institutions like party laws or the elec-
tion system (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 18). Therefore, prospects for parties to
continuously develop a coherent party apparatus have often been inhibited by
structural confinements that are beyond the control of the parties themselves.
Moreover, parties in the developing world are rarely founded by a group of
visionary elites with a persuasive ideology and an elaborate party platform.
Instead, party politics in the Southern hemisphere is often dominated by charis-
matic leaders who establish parties with the sole intention of using them as their
personal election vehicles. While in the early stages of party formation a certain
degree of charisma is not necessarily antithetical to systemness, in the long-term
a gradual transfer of decisional authority from the leader to the party as a
collective actor is needed in order to facilitate party institutionalization as rules
and regulations are more easily implemented without an almighty party patron.19
Another issue related to structural institutionalization is the access to finan-
cial resources. Mass parties with regular revenues from membership fees are
almost non-existent outside Europe so that parties need to open up other chan-
nels for funding. Money is needed for a broad array of activities like election
campaigns, the maintenance of permanent offices, policy research and political
education, or the support for party-affiliated institutions such as think-tanks or
so-called ‘independent foundations,’ to name but a few. Especially the escalat-
ing cost of election campaigns has increasingly forced parties to find new
sources of revenue (Ferdinand 2003).20 Many countries have regulated party
finance in relevant laws, but often these laws are poorly enforced so that it is
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sometimes hard to distinguish between political finance and political corruption
(Pinto-Duschinsky 2002: 80).
In fact, political corruption is one of the most serious obstacles to formal
party institutionalization.21 In many countries corruption is so common nowa-
days that some scholars have come to view it as an institution in its own right
(Böröcz 2000). In contrast to formal institutions such as constitutions or other
formally binding regulations, however, corruption does not take on a tangible
form as it is not put down on paper for everyone to see. It is an informal institu-
tion which often deliberately undermines the enforcement of existing formal
institutions. The negative implications of such informal institutions for processes
of democratic consolidation were first highlighted by O’Donnell (1996) who
saw them as one of the biggest obstacles to democracy in Latin America.
Defined as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, commu-
nicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and
Levitsky 2004: 727), informal institutions are often created as a surrogate where
formal institutions are few in number or too weak to fulfil the security expecta-
tions of important actors. While some of these informal rules and regulations
can actually help to enhance the efficiency of existing formal institutions,22 all
too often they live at the expense of formal institutions and exploit the latter for
their own needs, thereby making it very difficult for the formal rules of the game
to fulfil their tasks. Lauth (2000: 26) has described these kinds of informal insti-
tutions as ‘parasitic institutions’ as they are ‘either partially occupying or penet-
rating’ formal institutions. Similarly, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have called
them ‘competing informal institutions’ as they diminish the effectiveness of
formal institutions.
Apart from corruption, two other potentially dangerous informal institutions
can be identified in the context of party institutionalization. One is the wide-
spread phenomenon of factionalism, the other the prevalence of clientelism. Fac-
tionalism in particular has been described as diametrically opposed to party
institutionalization because of the damaging impact it has on organizational
coherence (Janda 1980, Panebianco 1988, Türsan 1995). In the context of demo-
cratic consolidation processes, factionalism within parties is often blamed for
the emergence of highly volatile party systems, which in turn can have negative
implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of both the executive and the
legislature (Riedinger 1995, Croissant 1997). Other scholars, however, contest
this gloomy view of factionalism and point to the positive contributions factions
have made during democratic transitions (Waller and Gillespie 1995). Further-
more, long-established parties like the Japanese LDP or the Congress Party in
India are evidence that factionalism is not necessarily a source of instability
(Richardson 1997, Köllner 1999). In the light of these contrasting views, Sugi-
arto (2006: 3) has stressed that ‘it is necessary to emphasise that party factional-
ism can both facilitate and hinder the consolidation of the new party system.’
The divergent assessments of factionalism can be put down to the differing
characteristics of factions in certain political, social and cultural settings. Beller
and Belloni (1978), who are widely credited with the most frequently quoted
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definition of factions,23 point out that factionalism can not only have many
causes, but it can also take on various forms. For instance, where factions come
into being merely in response to a specific political issue or as a result of person-
alism or clientelism, they tend to be weakly organized and in most cases short-
lived or of intermediate duration only. On the other hand, those factions that
pursue more ideological goals or those which see themselves as the mouthpiece
of a certain social or regional group, are often more institutionalized in their own
right. These ‘institutionalized or organizational factions’ can have their own
internal rulings and procedures as well as easily recognizable names and
symbols (Beller and Belloni 1978: 427–30).24 Where their existence within the
host party is based on mutual tolerance, institutionalized factions can make a
significant contribution to the aggregation, integration and representation of
societal interests.
As indicated above, in some cases factionalism is closely associated with
clientelistic relationships between a political patron and his followers (clients).
In fact, clientelism remains a widespread phenomenon in large parts of the
developing world and its influence on the formation and institutionalization of
parties and party systems cannot be denied. Most scholars regard clientelism as
inimical to party institutionalization as it prioritizes individual interests at the
expense of the party. Accordingly, Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 20) have
summarized the negative implications of clientelism for party institutionaliza-
tion, arguing that it ‘undermines rules and regularized procedures, reducing the
party constitution if there be one to a meaningless sham.’ However, the authors
also point out that in the context of party politics clientelism should not only be
understood in its traditional sense as a face-to-face relationship of personal
exchange between an individual patron and his followers (Scott 1972). Rather, a
party itself as a collective actor can be identified as a patron who offers and dis-
tributes to its electorate material or professional benefits such as government
posts or positions in the party bureaucracy. Perceived in this way, clientelism
may be seen as less threatening to the systemness of a party than in its tradi-
tional form (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 21).25
Decisional autonomy
Second, decisional autonomy, as conceptualized by Randall and Svåsand, looks
at the party’s relations with its external environment. Huntington (1968) and
Panebianco (1988) have both stressed the need for autonomy as a distinct
dimension of institutionalization, whereas Janda (1980) and Levitsky (1998)
have questioned the necessity to include the issue of autonomy in the context of
party institutionalization.26 The disagreement mainly revolves around hazy con-
ceptions of when a party is dependent on another economic, political or social
actor or when it is just closely linked to such an external sponsor. In other
words, it is not always sufficiently clear what autonomy actually means. For
Panebianco (1988: 55–6), crucial elements of autonomy are control over finan-
cial resources, domination of collateral organizations, a well-developed party
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bureaucracy and the freedom to choose party leaders from within. On the other
hand, he maintains that a party that is dependent on external actors for the provi-
sion of financial, material or human resources is weakly institutionalized as the
party’s constituency might be more closely affiliated with the external actor than
with the party as such. But this view has been challenged by scholars like Jones
(1997) or Janda (1980), who argue that parties like Peron’s Partido Justicialista
(PJ) in Argentina or the British Labour Party reached a high degree of institu-
tionalization regardless of their close relations with the trade unions.
While acknowledging ambiguities in the concept of autonomy, Randall and
Svåsand, in their attempt to accommodate differing views on institutionalization,
have narrowed down the idea of autonomy to the crucial element of decision-
making processes. They concede that close links to external forces do not
necessarily weaken a party’s degree of institutionalization as long as the party is
still the dominant force in the relationship and as long as it is able to maintain ‘a
significant degree of decisional autonomy, or freedom from interference in
determining its own policies and strategies’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 14).
In fact, such links may even be conducive to party institutionalization, especially
in times of democratic transitions when newly formed parties are in need of
external sponsorship to counter the organizational advantages of the established
ruling party.
The idea of concentrating on decisional autonomy rather than organizational
autonomy in general is an innovative attempt to allow for a tightly focused
investigation of a party’s ability to forge its own destiny. Unfortunately,
however, Randall and Svåsand’s discussion of the subject matter falls short in a
number of aspects. First, they fail to mention a number of critically important
actors that have the potential to compromise a party’s decisional autonomy.
Second, they fail to acknowledge that it is not only actors, but also structural
factors that can limit a party’s decisional autonomy. And third, their focus on
decision-making processes rather than organizational autonomy as a whole
raises questions about the conceptualization of autonomy as an external dimen-
sion of party institutionalization. These issues are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
To begin with, Randall and Svåsand only mention three different actors that
can potentially compromise a party’s decisional autonomy. First, in countries
with strong class cleavages, trade unions have traditionally linked up with
Labour and communist parties and supported them with material and human
resources. In the context of Indonesia, for instance, the emergence of the Indone-
sian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) as a strong political
force in the 1960s was at least facilitated by the party’s close ties with the
country’s largest trade-union federation (Mortimer 1974). Second, religious
organizations have more or less actively supported the founding of political
parties. Examples from Asia include India, where the radical Hindu organization
Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS) was heavily involved in the establishment of the
Jan Sangh which was later revitalized as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and
Indonesia, where the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which itself
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acted as a party for a limited time, sponsored the creation of the PKB.27 Third,
transnational party organizations like the Council of Asian Liberals and Demo-
crats or the Socialist International may act as external sponsors as they assist
parties in democratizing countries through workshops, training and funding.
However, since programmatic parties are rare in large parts of the developing
world, so far only a very few parties are linked through these networks and the
impact of the assistance programmes, both in ideological and organizational
terms, seems to be fairly limited (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 23).
Apart from these three examples, however, there are several other societal
forces that have the potential to constrain a party’s decisional autonomy. The
role of the military, for instance, cannot be excluded from this discussion. While
in most countries the armed forces are not directly associated with party politics,
there are certainly examples where the military has openly intervened in the
formation of political parties. Africa has been particularly notorious in this
regard (Sahli 2003: 19–27), but countries in other parts of the world have also
been affected as the Milli Demokrati Partisi in Turkey (1983) or the Samakkhi
Tham Party in Thailand (1992) show.28 In Indonesia, the military was involved
in the formation of the short-lived League of Supporters of Indonesian
Independence (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, IPKI) in the 1950s.
Later, of course, it initiated the establishment of Golkar.
At the other end of the extreme there are also various political parties who act
or have acted as official or semi-official representatives of separatist or terrorist
movements. Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland and Herri Batasuna in Spain are but
two examples of parties that cannot be separated from the terrorist organizations
behind them.29 In Indonesia, it was long considered to be impossible to establish
such parties because organizations such as the Acehnese Independence Move-
ment (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) or the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi
Papua Merdeka, OPM) used to be regarded as enemies of the state by the
Indonesian authorities. With the signing of the 2005 Memorandum of Under-
standing between the Indonesian government and GAM, however, circum-
stances have changed. In fact, it now seems almost inevitable that not only one,
but several political parties affiliated with GAM will emerge in the run-up to the
2009 general election (International Crisis Group 2007: 3).30
Finally, the increasing importance of money as a pivotal factor in politics has
opened up new space for organized or individual business actors to pursue their
interests through political parties. In some cases, business tycoons simply form
their own parties and use them as a political vehicle,31 but business actors more
often act behind the scenes, from where they influence decision-making
processes within parties without being formally involved in a particular party.
However, it should be noted here that the growing influence of capital is not
necessarily tied to the presence of businessmen. Any affluent actor can interfere
in politics, regardless of his or her profession. Therefore, it is suggested here that
in order to determine a party’s degree of decisional autonomy it is imperative to
not only look at the influence of specific actors or organizations, but also at the
structural power of capital. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 7, decision-
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making processes in Indonesian parties are often determined by financial consid-
erations rather than policy concerns. To make matters worse, these decisions are
often made within extremely small elite circles in Jakarta, which deprives the
party as a collective political organization of its decisional autonomy.
Of course, it could be argued that every large social organization needs to
concentrate its decision-making processes at the top of its organizational infra-
structure if it wants to operate effectively and efficiently. This natural trend
towards oligarchy was already highlighted by Michels (1959) a long time ago.
However, patterns of oligarchy in many Indonesian parties tend to be particu-
larly pronounced, not least because they are often compounded by the absence
of accountability mechanisms and consultation processes between the party elite
and the grassroots. Parties with strong and charismatic leaders, in particular,
often neglect the party organization. Such problems indicate that a party’s deci-
sional autonomy can be encroached upon by external actors and also by
members of the party itself. An exclusive conceptualization of decisional auto-
nomy as an external dimension of party institutionalization therefore appears
somewhat inappropriate.
Value infusion
Turning to the attitudinal dimension of party institutionalization, value infusion
concerns a party’s popular base and the members’ identification with and attach-
ment to the party. In order to institutionalize in this dimension a party needs to
acquire a reasonably large core group of followers (members or supporters)
which commits itself to the party not only for its own self-interest but also for
the sake of the party itself. Any party that claims to represent the aspirations of a
certain societal group needs to be or become thoroughly infused with the social,
cultural or political values of this particular group. If successful, the party even-
tually ‘becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and
indistinguishable from it’ (Panebianco 1988: 53). The creation of a distinctive
value system can significantly contribute to party cohesion as it provides the
basis for strong ties between the party as an organization and its members and
supporters.
While sources of value infusion can be manifold, Randall and Svåsand
(2002a: 21) note that ‘[v]alue infusion is likely to be strongest where the polit-
ical party is identified with a broader social movement.’ In a Western European
context this correlation was famously described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
who identified the four classic social cleavages class, religion, region and the
rural/urban divide as key engines behind the formation and consolidation of
Western European mass parties. To a certain extent these cleavages can also be
found in the countries of the developing world, with the centre/periphery divide
and religion being the most salient of the classic four.
Although the mere existence of cleavages does not necessarily entail the
formation of political parties along these cleavages, some Asian and African
countries have indeed witnessed the formation of regional and religious parties.
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In addition, ethnic parties have also gained increasing prominence in recent years
(Reilly 2006, Rüland 2001),32 particularly but not only in Latin America where
indigenous movements have formed a number of successful political parties (Van
Cott 2005). While some observers see the potential contribution of such parties to
democratic development in a positive light (Madrid 2005), others are more scepti-
cal.33 Gunther and Diamond (2001: 23–4), for instance, have argued that ‘the
ethnic party’s particularistic, exclusivist, and often polarizing political appeals
make its overall contribution to society divisive and even disintegrative.’
Many governments in the developing world apparently share Gunther and
Diamond’s view and have resorted to a variety of means to contain the influence
of not only ethnic, but also religious and regional parties. While in some cases
existing parties were simply banned (e.g. Masyumi in Indonesia, the Islamic Sal-
vation Front (FIS) in Algeria or the Refah Party in Turkey), a more frequently
used tool has been the creation of institutional regulations that seek to weaken
the influence of exclusivist parties. As Reilly (2006, 2007) has shown, such
political engineering measures can come in various disguises, ranging from
electoral reform (for example the introduction of majoritarian electoral systems
or electoral thresholds) to the formulation of requirements for parties to have a
nationwide organizational apparatus. Many governments in the Asia-Pacific
region have engaged in at least some form of political engineering in recent
years, and while the main motivations have differed from country to country, it
seems that an important consideration has always been to contain the polariza-
tion and fragmentation of the party system.34
An inevitable and indeed often deliberately intended side effect of such meas-
ures is the strengthening of broad-based electoralist mainstream parties which,
ironically, often lack any kind of distinctive values. In many ways, these parties
resemble European-style catch-all parties with their often vague and superficial
programmatic platforms, but despite the ‘drastic reduction of [. . .] ideological
baggage’ (Ufen 2006: 23) many parties in the developing world have actually
crafted their own distinct identity based on values which may not be linked to
traditional cleavages, but which are nonetheless powerful tools for the mobil-
ization of members and supporters.
Randall (2001), for example, points to the importance of nationalism as a
driving force of party formation in many African countries. In Asia, the Indian
Congress Party and the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia,
PNI) are further examples of aggregative, broad-based parties whose value infu-
sion was primarily based on nationalism as a unifying ideology against the colo-
nial powers. But nationalism as a source of value infusion is not confined to the
period prior to and at the point of gaining independence. As the legacies of colo-
nialism loom large in lengthy and often complicated nation-building processes,
nationalism has never completely lost its momentum. On the contrary, in more
recent years the negative consequences of globalization and free trade have trig-
gered a resurgence of nationalist sentiment, often manifested in fierce anti-
Western rhetoric. This trend is evident not only in developing countries but also
in some parts of Eastern Europe (Von Beyme 1997).
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Nationalism, however, rarely serves as a sole basis of value infusion. Often
nationalist ideas are conveyed through a charismatic leader, so that the real
sources of identification with and attachment to the party may blur. For example,
the Indian Congress Party and the Indonesian PNI owed their support not only to
the rising forces of nationalism, but also to the appeal of their charismatic
leaders, Nehru and Sukarno. The two parties are proof that under special circum-
stances even personalism and clientelism can serve as sources of value infusion.
In India, the Nehru family continued to dominate politics long after the death of
Nehru, and in Indonesia the legacy of Sukarno was revived in the 1990s by his
daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri. Her rise to the presidency – and her continu-
ing popularity after the loss of it – show that the combination of personalism and
nationalism can still be a very potent political force.
Finally, in many countries that have experienced periods of authoritarianism
another historical factor that has significantly shaped the processes of party
formation is the dividing line between forces aligned with or sympathetic to the
old regime (‘status quo’) on the one hand, and reformist forces on the other hand
(Randall 2001).35 Von Beyme (1997) also mentions this additional cleavage in
his discussion of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, but he also stresses the
transitional character of this cleavage, implying that it is only a temporary phe-
nomenon that does not qualify as a long-term source of value infusion.
Reification
The last dimension of party institutionalization, reification, reflects the ability of
a party to establish itself as a household name in the political discourse of a
country. For Janda (1980: 19) reification is the defining characteristic of an insti-
tutionalized party. He claims that ‘an institutionalized party is one that is reified
in the public mind so that “the party” exists as a social organization apart from
its momentary leaders.’ This definition clearly takes up notions of value infu-
sion, but the important point in Janda’s concept is that reification deals more
with the perception of the party by the wider society than with the party’s rela-
tions with its core constituency.
In order to establish itself in the public imagination, a party needs to create
and develop effective means of interaction with the public. Therefore, regular
access to the mass media is a vital necessity for any party that wants to dissemi-
nate its political message to the public. Contemporary politics is conveyed to the
people primarily through the mass media and no party nowadays can afford to
be shunned by the media. Similarly important for reification is the efficient use
of well-known symbols and labels as they serve as tools for the public to struc-
ture their electoral preferences. As Mainwaring (1999: 12) has argued, ‘[i]t
would be impossible to begin every election anew, with no established party
labels, without shortcuts that tell the electorate who is who.’ Voters naturally
associate certain expectations with political parties. But usually only a small
minority knows exact details about the programmes and policies of the parties.
Instead, most people tend to ‘rely on symbols and organizations to orient their
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conceptual universe’ (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 3). A party’s name plays a
crucial role in this regard but traditional symbols, colours or catchy slogans can
also be effective means to secure a place in the minds of the people.
Reification is a long process and can only be achieved in time. As Randall
and Svåsand (2002a: 23) put it, ‘party reification is finally and importantly a
function of longevity, the party’s ability to survive over time.’ Needless to say
that in countries that have just recently embarked on the path of democrat-
ization, reification is still a non-issue for many parties. While democratic trans-
itions often bring about a mushrooming of new political parties, normally only a
very few survive the initial euphoria surrounding the founding elections. Com-
pared to the multitude of newcomers, those parties that already existed either
before or under the ousted authoritarian regime enjoy a significant advantage in
terms of reification. Interestingly, this can be true for both former regime and
former opposition parties. In some cases, for instance, parties that had been
banned under authoritarian rule have shown an amazing resilience in the face of
prolonged repression. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa or
the PJ in Argentina are just two examples of parties, which have successfully
retained their place in the public consciousness during long phases of authorit-
arian rule. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, ‘historical parties’ (Segert and
Machos 1995) were far less successful. Instead, the successor parties of the for-
merly hegemonic communist parties emerged surprisingly strongly in many
post-communist elections, especially in Russia (March 2002) and in the former
‘national consensus regimes’ (Ishiyama 1997) of Poland and Hungary.
The virtues of multidimensional models
The suggested model combines all important aspects of party institutionalization
and integrates them into one comprehensive analytical framework. Accordingly,
party institutionalization is a process that takes place in several dimensions, all
of which need to be analysed and evaluated separately.36 Levitsky (2003: 16–17)
has objected that research based on such multidimensional models can have ana-
lytical costs when organizations reach different degrees of institutionalization in
the individual dimensions, but arguably such problems can be avoided if the
results in the respective dimensions are not just simply aggregated but accu-
rately distinguished before final conclusions are drawn.
Of course, it is almost natural that parties do not institutionalize simultan-
eously in all dimensions. In practice certain parties may be highly institutional-
ized in one dimension while remaining weakly institutionalized in another
(Morlino 1998).37 But that does not mean that any of the four dimensions can
simply be omitted from the analysis. As a matter of fact, theoretical models
hardly ever match complex realities, but the more complex the model the better
its chances of reflecting and explaining reality accurately. The conduct of one-
dimensional research only leads to highly contrasting assessments of institution-
alization as exemplified by the case of the Argentinian PJ. This party has been
the focus of much scholarly research but there are huge discrepancies in the
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assessments of institutionalization. Jones (1997: 272) for example characterizes
the party as ‘highly institutionalized,’ whereas Levitsky (2003: 3) and McGuire
(1997: 1) have described it as ‘weakly institutionalized’.
Party institutionalization versus party system institutionalization
The most significant feature of Randall and Svåsand’s institutionalization model,
however, is not its multidimensionality (Huntington’s and Mainwaring’s models
are also multidimensional), but its clear differentiation between party institution-
alization and party system institutionalization. As was mentioned earlier, many
authors fail to make this distinction, seemingly assuming an automatic interde-
pendence between the two. Yet this assumption is erroneous. As Randall and
Svåsand (2002a: 8) stress, ‘[p]arty system institutionalization is the outcome of a
range of developments, only some of which have to do directly with the con-
stituent parties themselves.’ While the authors concede that requirements for
party institutionalization and party system institutionalization are in many
respects ‘mutually supportive or at least compatible’ (Randall and Svåsand
2002a: 8), they suggest analysing party system institutionalization in four dis-
tinct categories, similarly structured as the party institutionalization model
(shown in Figure 2.2).
First, continuity and stability are key elements of any competitive institution-
alized party system.38 In the words of Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 4–5),
‘where [. . .] stability does not exist, institutionalization is limited.’ In fact, some
authors regard stability as so crucially important that they have limited their
analysis of party system institutionalization to just this component (Lindberg
2007). To a certain extent, stability is a direct result of party institutionalization
as only a stable number of institutionalized parties can prevent the system from
becoming highly volatile. As long as the parties themselves are weakly
institutionalized, disintegration and re-formation of new parties will remain
common features of the party system. Consequently, volatility will remain high
and the party system is unlikely to stabilize. However, continuity and stability
do not only depend on institutionalized parties. Equally important are
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Figure 2.2 Dimensions of party system institutionalization (source: adapted from
Randall and Svåsand 2001: 91).
well-administered political institutions such as the form of government
(presidential or parliamentary) and especially the electoral system (majoritarian/
plurality or proportional representation). Thus, the nature of the electoral institu-
tions should always be considered in the analysis of stability as a component of
party system institutionalization.
Majoritarian or plurality systems are generally regarded as more conducive to
the stability of party systems because they tend to foster the emergence of two-
party systems. Proportional representation, however, which more often leads to
multi-party systems and is therefore regarded as fairer than majoritarian
systems, does not necessarily rule out stable party systems.39 In view of the
necessity for electoral systems to not only provide stability, but also fair and
equal representation of all segments of society, Merkel (1998) dismisses both
pure majoritarian/plurality and pure proportional representation systems as not
suitable for democratizing countries. Instead, he argues in favour of either pro-
portional representation with significant thresholds or mixed electoral systems
with an ‘almost equally weighted combination of PR [proportional representa-
tion] and plurality election elements’ (Merkel 1998: 51).40
Second, an institutionalized party system has to be protected from arbitrary
interference from the state. According to Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 8),
prospects for party system institutionalization improve when the individual parties
‘are supported by public measures, such as public subsidies, access to media and
legal protection for their existence, for instance in the constitution or in ordinary
laws.’ However, in many countries of the developing world these measures are far
from guaranteed and even where the regulations exist, their implementation is
often poor. This aspect of party system institutionalization is further complicated
by the fact that state actors are often directly involved in the formation of new
parties in order to ensure preferential treatment for their own parties (Mainwaring
1999). The Indonesian party system during the New Order was a prime example
of a system that was weakly institutionalized in this dimension.
The third dimension, mutual acceptance of the parties that constitute the
system, is a critical precondition for parties to accept the possibility of electoral
defeat. In times of transition sentiments of suspicion and mistrust tend to run
high, especially towards parties that are believed to maintain links to old regime
elites. However, for a party system to institutionalize, the individual parties that
make up the system need to fully respect the system and ‘accept each other as
legitimate competitors’ (Randall and Svåsand 2001: 92). If this does not happen,
the validity of electoral results will constantly be challenged and parties may not
accept the role of parliamentary opposition.
Finally, the party system should be appreciated by the electorate. If parties
and the competitive electoral process as a means of electing a legislature and a
government are respected as taken-for-granted institutions, the party system as a
whole can be regarded as institutionalized. However, in many democratizing
countries political parties are among the least trusted political actors.41 While
similar findings have also been noted for many Western democracies (Listhaug
and Wiberg 1995), the implications for newly democratizing countries are far
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more negative as widespread mistrust in the party system increases the possibil-
ity of an authoritarian backlash.
The potential perils of uneven party institutionalization
Implicit in most concepts of party system institutionalization, including Randall
and Svåsand’s, is the notion that prospects for a party system to institutionalize
are likely to be enhanced by the institutionalization of individual parties. Yet
Randall and Svåsand are to be credited for pointing out quite explicitly that there
is no automatism between the two issues. On the contrary, under special circum-
stances party institutionalization may even be counterproductive to party system
institutionalization and consequently to democratic consolidation. One example
concerns the aspect of value infusion and its relation to party system institution-
alization. As Randall and Svåsand (2002a: 9) rightly mention, cross-party
competition could be restricted and the mutual respect and acceptance among
parties severely undermined if large parts of the population identify with parties
that are based on highly polarizing religious or ethnic values. The stronger and
more institutionalized these exclusivist parties grow, the higher the danger of the
democratic party system being dismantled. It is therefore hardly surprising that
many countries have engaged in all sorts of political engineering in order to
minimize the threats posed by such parties.
A second example, which is of particular interest to this book, is the uneven
character of party institutionalization in times of democratic transitions. The
commonly held view that party institutionalization is a crucial precondition for
democratic consolidation is based on the assumption that all parties enjoy a
relatively even degree of institutionalization. In established democracies, this
may be true. In democratizing countries, however, degrees of party
institutionalization often vary significantly between new parties and those with
close connections to the preceding authoritarian regime (Wallis 2003). Espe-
cially in the early stages of a transition period, financial, material and human
resources are often distributed very unevenly and this has implications for party
institutionalization, particularly in the dimension of systemness where imbal-
ances are likely to provide considerable advantages for former regime parties.
Indeed, the different degrees of institutionalization between old and new
parties tend to be most clearly visible in the dimension of systemness where new
opposition parties that have emerged during the transition often lack a strong
organizational infrastructure and their inexperienced members rarely possess the
professional skills that are needed to handle parliamentary or government
affairs. On the other hand, old regime parties frequently capitalize on the exist-
ence of a well-organized party apparatus, better access to financial resources or
the political shrewdness of their leading cadres. Organizational superiority has
been named as one of the main reasons for the strong performance of ex-
communist parties in Poland, Hungary or Russia (March 2002, Waller 1995),
and it has also been an important factor in the transformation of other former
hegemonic parties like the Taiwanese KMT or the Mexican PRI. While the
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KMT’s Leninist party structure resembles those of the Eastern European com-
munist parties, the PRI is a different case as it was never a state party per se but
rather an ‘extension of the state machine and its tame corporatist organizations.
It existed to reward loyalty and not to compete for power’ (Philip 2002: 140).
Nevertheless, in order to fulfil this ‘primary goal’ (Harmel and Janda 1994), the
PRI was equipped with vast human, material and financial resources that, for a
long time, made it difficult for the opposition to challenge the PRI’s hegemony.
In the other dimensions of party institutionalization, former regime parties
may also enjoy advantages, but to what extent that occurs – or whether it occurs
at all – often depends on the nature of the preceding regime. As a matter of fact,
even before the emergence of recent phenomena such as competitive or electoral
authoritarianism, non-democratic regimes came in all shapes and sizes. It is
therefore important to remember that ‘not all authoritarian regimes are alike’
(Rigger 2000: 143).42 In military-dominated or highly personalistic regimes, for
example, ruling parties often possess little-to-no decisional autonomy and few
meaningful political values. Once democratization commences in such regimes,
the former regime parties may try to reinvent themselves by embracing demo-
cracy and denouncing their connections to the armed forces, but their prospects
for institutionalization in the dimensions of decisional autonomy and value infu-
sion are likely to remain low.
On the other hand, transitions from authoritarianism in regimes where a
strong political party formed an integral part of the power structure can be
expected to produce very different outcomes with regards to party institutional-
ization in these two dimensions. The Russian communist party (Communist
Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF) or the Taiwanese KMT are but two
examples of former regime parties that were and continue to be highly
autonomous and infused with strong political values. In the case of the CPRF,
for instance, the party’s unrelenting commitment to communism after the end of
the Cold War has helped it keep its place in the post-Soviet party system as it
continues to benefit from people’s enduring attachment to communism as an
identity-providing ideology (March 2002, Miller and White 1998).43
As far as reification is concerned, former regime parties are most likely to
enjoy comparative advantages in countries where the authoritarian regime did not
allow opposition parties to operate. Under such circumstances new parties
founded during or after the transition often face an uphill battle to establish them-
selves in the public consciousness. This task is made even more difficult if old
regime elites continue to maintain control over key means of communication like
the mass media. In Taiwan, for instance, where opposition parties were banned
until 1986, their legalization did not immediately provide them with equal
opportunities to disseminate their political programme. Most of the country’s TV
stations were directly or indirectly owned by the ruling KMT so that media
coverage continued to be biased in the KMT’s favour for several years after the
initiation of the transition to democracy. Only with the introduction of cable TV
in the mid-1990s, was more neutral and critical coverage finally made possible,
and today the opposition also owns its own media outlets (Chu 1999).
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Generally, opposition parties have much better prospects of establishing
themselves in the public mind if they have been allowed to operate during the
authoritarian period. In Mexico, for example, the oldest opposition party was
founded back in 1939, and other opposition parties existed throughout the era of
hegemonic PRI rule. Under these circumstances, reification is not really an issue
of inequality, even though advantages for the ruling party may be discernible in
rural areas.44 In addition, it should also be noted that reification may also offer
advantages to the opposition in countries where repression under the authorit-
arian regime was extremely harsh. In this case, name recognition may backfire
for old regime parties as their discredited names, symbols and logos could
trigger such a strongly negative reaction by the public that this particular party
may be forced into a low-profile role.
Final remarks
In sum, transitions from authoritarian rule can, depending on the characteristics
of the outgoing authoritarian regime and the nature of the actual transition
process, produce situations in which political parties that compete for power in
the new political environment are not evenly institutionalized. This unevenness
is often particularly pronounced in the dimension of systemness where old
regime parties tend to enjoy vastly superior access to financial, material and
human resources. Moreover, former regime parties also tend to have advantages
in the dimension of reification as new parties often have difficulties matching the
high levels of name recognition of their widely known competitors.
If this unevenness is highly pronounced and perpetuated for a long time, it
may have negative implications for the institutionalization of the party system as
a whole. Particularly vulnerable are the internal dimensions of stability and
mutual acceptance, but the appreciation by the electorate may also remain low if
old elites continue to control access to power. By jeopardizing party system
institutionalization, uneven party institutionalization is also likely to further pro-
tract the overall transition to democracy because the competitiveness and fair-
ness of elections might be compromised. Therefore, former regime parties might
have to de-institutionalize first before the party system can become a level
playing field. At the same time, however, it is equally important that new parties
take active steps towards their own institutionalization so that they can actually
benefit from the ensuing de-institutionalization of the former regime parties. If
new parties remain passive, they are unlikely to become capable of challenging
the dominance of the former regime party.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework which will guide the empir-
ical discussion in the following sections. The twin purpose of this chapter has
been to emphasize the importance of political parties for processes of demo-
cratic consolidation and to highlight the necessity to distinguish between party
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institutionalization and party system institutionalization as two distinct theo-
retical concepts. From the various institutionalization models developed by other
scholars, Randall and Svåsand’s model was chosen as the most suitable frame-
work for this book because it was specifically designed as a tool to analyse the
institutionalization of individual political parties rather than the party system.
Political parties remain, despite widespread dissatisfaction with their
performance, at the centre of democratic politics. Nearly all established demo-
cracies in the world feature a number of institutionalized parties that operate in
institutionalized party systems. In the developing world, however, parties with
broadly accepted and widely applied formal rules and regulations are an excep-
tion rather than the norm, and there is a growing awareness in academic circles
that this lack of institutionalization can at least partly explain why so few coun-
tries that initiated transitions from authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s have
moved decisively towards democratic consolidation. In specific circumstances,
democracy may in fact thrive without institutionalized parties, but as Randall
(2006: 31) declared so succinctly, ‘institutionalization helps’ because it
enhances prospects for stability in the party system and often improves the
chances for parties to accept electoral defeat.
Having said that, the preceding discussion has also pointed out that if party
institutionalization is very uneven in character, it can actually be harmful to
party system institutionalization as well as to democratic consolidation as a
whole. Where former regime parties can monopolize access to crucial resources
to such an extent that they can not only maintain a strong position in the post-
authoritarian party system but even dictate the course of the transition, prospects
for democratic consolidation are likely to be compromised because elections
will be lacking in fairness and competitiveness.
The following chapters will utilize these theoretical findings and apply them
to the case of Indonesia where the former regime party Golkar continues to play
a formidable role in the post-New Order era. Four topical chapters on each
dimension of party institutionalization and one additional comparative chapter
on the other main parties’ degrees of institutionalization will help answer the
question whether Golkar’s enduring strength can indeed be explained as a result
of uneven party institutionalization and whether the party’s strong position poses
a threat to party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation in
Indonesia.
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